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THE EVOLUTION AND SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE RIGHT OF MUSICAL WORKS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL, U.S. AND EGYPTIAN COPYRIGHT LAWS
by DR. M. F. MAKEEN*
INTRODUCTION
It is often stated that no problem in contemporary copyright law has
been debated more extensively or intensely than the question of whether a
specified act of communication has taken place in public or in private,1 yet
relatively little is written on the evolution and scope of the public perform-
ance right.  Furthermore, the literature that exists does not cover the copy-
right and droit d’auteur traditions or compare the approach adopted by the
developed countries to that of the developing countries.  This article aims
to partially fill this gap by examining the evolution and scope of the public
performance right in the United States of America and Egypt.
In addition to being a developed country that follows the copyright
tradition, the U.S. hosts the biggest music market in the world, with reve-
nues from communication in public making up the largest share in that
market.2  Egypt, on the other hand, is a developing country with a droit
d’auteur system that has been followed by a number of Middle Eastern
countries, including UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait.3  Furthermore, Egypt has
long been a cultural powerhouse in the Middle East, with arguably the
biggest music market in the region.
I. SCOPE AND STRUCTURE
While the public performance right in the U.S., and to a lesser extent
in Egypt, covers communication in and to the public, this article is solely
concerned with the communication in public, i.e., the communication of
musical works before a gathered audience.  Therefore, any communication
to the public, whether by broadcasting, cabling, retransmission by cable
and/or Internet streaming fall outside the scope of this article.  Accord-
*Senior Lecturer, SOAS, University of London.
1 14 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW § 86, at 56 (Sig
Stro¨holm & Friedrich-Karl Baier eds., 1990).
2 Deidre McPhillips, Top 10 Most Musical Countries, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 15, 2016),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2016-02-15/top-10-most-musi-
cal-countries.
3 From the outset, it should be noted that very little is written on the droit
d’auteur of Egypt in general and the public performance right in particular.
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ingly, throughout this article, the term public performance and communi-
cation in public are used interchangeably.
This article is divided into three sections.  While Section II traces the
origin and development of the public performance right in the U.S. and
Egypt, Section III delves into the evolution and scope of the public per-
formance right under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works (1971).  Section IV examines the “public” requirement
under the copyright law of the U.S. and the author’s right law of Egypt.
II. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN THE U.S. AND EGYPT
Although the public performance of musical and dramatic works is
well recorded in the ancient civilisations of Egypt and Greece, the issue of
whether authors and composers enjoyed a public performance right in ei-
ther civilization seems to have been generally ignored.4 Therefore, it
would seem that the author’s right of public performance was developed
in France during the eighteenth century.5  For this reason, a brief summary
of the evolution of the public performance right in France is given here.
With the French Revolution, the demands of the Commission for the
Defence of Dramatic Authors were recognized and as a result, the decree
of January 13-19, 1791, was adopted.6  This decree not only terminated the
monopoly enjoyed by the Come´die Franc¸aise on the works of Molie`re and
others,7 but also recognized for authors of dramatic works the exclusive
right to authorize the performance of their works in public theatres.8  Al-
though some argue that the 1791 law extended protection to musical
works,9 and that it covered all public performances and not only those
given in public theatres, it was not until the judgement of the “tribunal de
4 Astonishingly, neither Egyptology nor Coptology seems to show interest in the
protection of authorship in ancient Egypt.
5 For a view that in Rome authors might have enjoyed a performing right in
dramatic works, see MARIE CLAUDE DOCK, E´TUDE SUR LE DROIT D’AUTEUR 34
(1963).
6 Le de´cret des 13-19 janvier 1791, COLLECTION COMPLE`TE DES LOIS 151 (Jean
Baptiste Duvergier ed., Paris, Guyot et Scribe, Libraires-Editeurs 2d ed. 1834).
7 Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolution-
ary France and America, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS 144 (Brad Sherman &
Alain Strowel eds., 1994).
8 Article Three of the 1791 Decree stated: “Les ouvrages des auteurs vivants ne
pourront eˆtre repre´sente´s sur aucun the´aˆtre public, dans toute l’e´tendue de la France,
sans le consentement formel et par e´crit des auteurs sous peine de confiscation du
produit total des repre´sentations au profit des auteurs.”
9 GAVIN MCFARLANE, COPYRIGHT: THE DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISE OF THE
PERFORMING RIGHT 49 (1980).
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la Seine” of September 18, 1847, that that was categorically confirmed.
Owing to its historical significance, the facts of this case will be outlined.
The composer Alexandre Bourget was accompanied by Victor Parizot
and Paul Henrion. They went to the Les Ambassadeurs cafe´ on the
Champs-E´lyse´es.  There, they heard one of Bourget’s musical works being
performed, and as a result Bourget refused to pay the bill for the refresh-
ments they had on the grounds that the cafe´ proprietor had not paid him
for the public performance of his composition.  Bourget applied for and
obtained an injunction against the cafe´ proprietor in respect of the
unauthorised performance of his work.10 Astonishingly, the cafe´ proprie-
tor ignored the court injunction and resumed performing Bourget’s work
in his cafe´.  Thereupon, the composer filed another suit before the same
court claiming compensation.  On August 3, 1848, the court awarded him
compensation,11 and on April 26, 1849, the judgment was confirmed by
the Paris Court of Appeal.12
Encouraged by the success of the case against the cafe´ proprietor,
authors and composers tried to enforce their performing right.   Soon,
however, they realised the limitations of individual enforcement.13  Aware
of the operation of the Socie´te´ des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques
(“SACD”) for the administration of the public representation right in dra-
matic works,14 Bourget, Parizot, and others decided to set up a collection
society to which they would assign the exercise of their public perform-
ance right in musical works, and which would grant licences and collect
royalties on their behalves.
As a result, on February 28, 1851, the Socie´te´ des Auteurs, Com-
positeurs et Editeurs de Musique (“SACEM”) was established and be-
came the first national collecting society for the administration of the
public performance right in musical works.  Shortly after coming into exis-
tence, SACEM enjoyed great success and became a model for future col-
lecting societies in several countries, including the U.S. and Egypt.
10 JEAN-LOUP TOURNIER, VIVRE DE SA MUSIQUE AVEC LA SACEM 27-28 (2006).
11 Louis Joseph D’Alton, A Critical Historical Analysis of the Public Perform-
ance Right 161-62, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western Ontario
2012), http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/442.
12 Archives de Paris, 3d chamber of the Cour d’appel de Paris, file D1U9/154,
cited in Staffan Albinsson, The Advent of Performing Rights in Europe, 6 MUSIC &
POLITICS (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/mp.9460447.0006.204.  It is worth noting
that Albinsson offers a different narrative than that mentioned above in the main
text.
13 These limitations include monitoring what venues perform the work, which in
turn would require a large force of investigators, contracting with each of these
venues, and pursuing through litigation those responsible for unauthorized public
performances.
14 SACD was founded in 1829.
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Compared to France, the public performance right was a relative
latecomer to U.S. copyright law.  While in France the public performance
right was the first exclusive economic right to be recognized,15 the first
U.S. Copyright Act of 1790 was solely concerned with the reproduction
right.16  It was not until 1856 that authors of dramatic works in the U.S.
had successfully obtained the exclusive right to perform their works in
public.17  In granting such a right, Congress had recognized the unique
nature of dramatic works and that it could provide income to their cre-
ators through performance, and not only through sale of copies.18  There-
fore, it could be argued that this Act reflected a change in the
understanding of copyright in the U.S., from a limited right to reprint to
ownership of an intellectual work that entitled the owner to the market
profits from any exploitation of the work, irrespective of changes of form
and medium.19
Unfortunately, similar to the position adopted under the British Dra-
matic Copyright Act 1833,20 the scope of the 1856 Act was limited to dra-
matic works, and did not extend to musical works.21  However, with the
widespread unauthorised public performance of operatic works, a bill was
introduced in 1894 for the protection against these acts through penal
sanctions.22  In order to secure to musical works the same level of protec-
tion afforded to dramatic works, a second bill was introduced and pro-
posed the adoption of the term “musical works” instead of “operatic
15 While in France, as discussed above, the public representation (performance)
right was recognized by the 1791 Decree, the reproduction right was recognized as
one of the author’s exclusive rights by the Decree of 19 July 1793. See Le de´cret
des 19-24 juillet 1793, 1 COLLECTION COMPLE`TE DES LOIS, DE´CRETS, ORDON-
NANCES, RE´GLEMENTS ET AVIS DU COUNSEIL D’ETAT 29-32 (Jean Baptiste
Duvergier ed., Paris, Chez Guyot et Scribe, Libraires-Editeurs 2d ed. 1834).
16 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
17 Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.  Section 1 of that Act granted au-
thors and proprietors of dramatic compositions “along with the sole right to print
and publish the said composition, the sole right also to act, perform, or represent
the same, or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or public
place during the whole period for which the copyright is obtained.”
18 H.R. REP. NO. 2222, at 4 (1909).
19 See Oren Bracha, Commentary on the U.S. Copyright Act Amendment 1856, in
PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (Lionel Bently & Martin Kret-
schmer eds., 2008), www.copyrighthistory.org.
20 Dramatic Copyright Act 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 15.  For the evolution and scope
of the public performance in the UK, see Makeen F. Makeen, Rationalising Per-
formance “in Public” Under UK Copyright Law, INTELL. PROP. Q. 117 (2016).
21 MacGillivray argued that a musical composition might have been protected
against unauthorized public performance under the 1856 Act, if it could be shown
to be part of a dramatic piece. See EVAN J. MACGILLIVRAY, A TREATISE UPON
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 287 (1902).
22 See H.R. REP. NO. 1191 (1894).
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works.”23  As a result, the 1897 Act was passed and granted authors and
composers the exclusive right to authorize the public performance of their
works.24
Strangely enough, the 1897 Act was hardly invoked by authors or cop-
yright owners of musical works.  This was mainly because the prevailing
logic among music publishers at the time perceived the public perform-
ance of a song as the best stimulus to sales of sheet music, which for copy-
right owners reflected the major source of revenue.25  Some publishers
even went as far as to include a printed notice on sheet music granting the
purchaser the right to perform the composition in public.26
Notwithstanding that the 1897 Act was almost dormant, during the
debates that preceded the 1909 Copyright Act, concerns were expressed
that the law as existed brought too many innocent performances within its
scope.  It was argued that it might even subject churches and schools to
copyright liability.  Accordingly, the 1909 Act limited the scope of the
public performance right in musical works to performances for profit.27
The odd approach adopted by the 1909 Act created an unjustified
distinction between dramatic and musical works.  Any unauthorized public
performance of a dramatic work would automatically trigger copyright lia-
bility, whereas the unauthorized performance of a musical work had to
take place in public and to be for profit, in order to constitute infringe-
ment.28  Accordingly, neither a private performance for profit nor a gratu-
itous or philanthropic public performance of a musical work fell within the
Act.29
Although it is difficult to rationalize such a distinction, it arguably
stemmed from the belief that someone who viewed a dramatic perform-
ance, even if given by amateurs on a non-profit basis, was not likely there-
after to attend a performance for profit of the same work.30  On the other
hand, it was believed that people would still pay for a “for profit” perform-
23 See H.R. REP. NO. 54-741, at 1 (1896).
24 Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481.
25 Bernard Korman, Performance Rights in Music Under Section 110 and 118 of
the 1976 Copyright Act, 22 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 521, 523 (1977).
26 Id.
27 1909 Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075.  By virtue of section 1(c), the
“for profit” requirement was also to cover the delivery, reading or presentation of
lectures, sermons, addresses or similar productions.
28 For a general criticism of the wording of the public performance provisions of
the 1909 Act, see R. ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW
164-66 (1912).
29 HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 423
(1944).
30 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 8-177
(2018).
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ance of a musical work given by professionals, even though they might
have attended a non-profit performance earlier of the same work.  In
other words, it was believed that any public performance of a dramatic
work would have a detrimental effect on the copyright owner’s ability to
profit from his or her work, but only public performances of musical works
that were “for profit” were thought to have that risk.31
As discussed above, the music industry was initially reluctant to en-
force the public performance right.  However, by the second decade of the
twentieth century, there was widespread use of gramophone records and
piano rolls to perform protected musical works in public, which seems to
have encouraged the industry to reconsider its position.  Concurrently,
American authors, composers and publishers became aware of the amount
of revenue collected by SACEM in France.  This led to a shift in their
perception of the notion of public performance, from being a mere stimu-
lus to sales of sheet music and gramophone records to a separate and inde-
pendent serious source of revenue.  In recognizing the potential of the
public performance right, authors, composers and publishers, together
with the assistance of the dedicated New York lawyer Nathan Burkan, set
up the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“AS-
CAP”) in 1914.32
While at present ASCAP is one of the biggest and most influential
collecting societies in the world, at its inception it had a difficult few years.
Shortly after it had been established, ASCAP’s very existence was chal-
lenged.  This was mainly because the 1909 Act failed to define the term
“for profit,” which allowed the Second Circuit of the Court of Appeals in
John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co. to give that term an extremely nar-
row interpretation.33  According to the court, the term “for profit,” as
used in the Copyright Act of 1909, meant a direct pecuniary charge for the
performance, such as an admission fee.34  Conversely, it did not cover an
indirect charge to the public, such as a performance in the dining room of
a hotel, which was only intended to increase patronage, and for which no
admission fee was charged.
31 Lydia Pallas Loren, The Evolving Role of “for Profit” Use in Copyright Law:
Lessons from the 1909 Act, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 255,
266 (2010).
32 Unlike most countries, where only one collecting society is entrusted with the
administration of the public performance right, in the U.S. there are four collecting
societies.  In addition to ASCAP, there is the Society of European Stage Authors
and Composers (“SESAC”) established in 1930, Broadcast Music Inc. (“BMI”)
established in 1939, and Global Music Right (“GMR”) established in 2013.
33 221 F. 229 (2d Cir. 1915).
34 Id. at 321.
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Shortly after that decision, Nathan Burkan filed Herbert v. Shanley
before the same court.35  This case concerned the song Sweethearts, which
was performed live in a restaurant where no admission fee was charged.
The owner of the copyright in the song sued the restaurant owner for in-
fringing his exclusive public performance right.  The defendant argued that
there was no performance for profit: even though the performers were
paid, no charge for admission was made to the patrons of the restaurant
for the privilege of listening to the music; neither was any additional
charge made for meals provided in the restaurant when such music was
performed.  The district court followed the Court of Appeals ruling in
John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co. and dismissed the claim.  The Court
of Appeals followed its earlier ruling and affirmed the rejection of Her-
bert’s claims.36
These two judgements almost put an end to ASCAP’s short life.
However, when the two cases were consolidated before the Supreme
Court, it reversed the decisions of the Second Circuit, and ASCAP re-
sumed its normal activities.  According to the Supreme Court, the indirect
charge to the public was enough to make the performance one for profit.
Justice Holmes said:
If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a performance
where money is taken at the door, they are very imperfectly pro-
tected. . . .   [T]here is no need to construe the statute so narrowly.  The
defendant’s performances are not elemosynary.  They are part of a total
for which the public pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is at-
tributed to a particular item which those present are expected to order is
not important.  It is true that the music is not the sole object, but neither
is the food, which probably could be got cheaper elsewhere.  The object is
a repast in surroundings that to people having limited powers of conver-
sation, or disliking the rival noise, give a luxurious pleasure not to be had
from eating a silent meal.  If music did not pay, it would be given up.  If it
pays, it pays out of the public’s pocket.  Whether it pays or not, the pur-
pose of employing it is profit, and that is enough.37
The Supreme Court decision had established beyond doubt that even
an indirect charge amounted to “profit.”  Even when there was neither
direct nor indirect charge to the public, courts followed the spirit of the
Supreme Court decision and interpreted the term “for profit” broadly to
cover any indirect benefit or profit obtained by a commercial enterprise.38
35 222 F. 344 (S.D.N.Y 1915).
36 229 F. 340 (2d Cir. 1916).
37 Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 595 (1917).
38 MAKEEN F. MAKEEN, COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE
SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL, US, UK AND
FRENCH LAW 39-41 (2000).
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From the beginning of the fourth decade of the twentieth century,
many attempts were made to reform the public performance right. Among
the very many proposals, some sought to apply the “for profit” require-
ment to all types of works, including dramatic works, whereas others
sought to remove the “for profit” requirement altogether.39  The Copy-
right Act of 1976 adopted the latter approach and abolished the “for
profit” requirement.
Abolishing the “for profit” requirement stemmed from the belief that
a broad “not for profit” exemption would hurt authors and could destroy
their incentive to compose or write.40  This is especially so, since perform-
ances continually supplant markets for sales of copies of music.  Further-
more, it was recognized that the line between commercial and non-profit
organizations was becoming increasingly difficult to draw: many of the so-
called “non-profit” organizations were highly subsidised and capable of
paying royalties.41  By repealing the “for profit” requirement, the 1976
Act had removed the odd distinction between dramatic and musical works
and attempted to adopt, at least in theory, a public performance right that
was subject matter neutral.42
Unlike in the U.S., it was not until the middle of the twentieth century
that Egypt enacted a specific author’s right law.43 Although Article 12 of
the old Civil Code of 1883 recognized the notion of author’s right, it inten-
tionally left the scope of protection to be determined by specific laws.  The
same approach was adopted under Article 86 of the new Civil Code of
1948, which states “rights in respect of intangibles are to be governed by
special laws.”44  This provision of the new Civil Code, which came into
force concurrently with the abolition of foreign privileges and Egypt
regaining full sovereignty over its legal system, seems to have indirectly
called upon the legislature to enact a specific law for the protection of
39 For the different proposals, see Loren, supra note 31, at 277-78.  Interestingly,
one of the many proposals and views expressed was to expand the performance
right to cover “home viewing” of motion pictures. See Boardman Lloyd, Disc-
Television: Some Recurring Copyright Problems in the Reproduction and Perform-
ance of Motion Pictures, 34 U. CHI L. REV. 686, 703 (1967).
40 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976); see also S. REP. NO. 93-983, at 112 (1974).
41 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62-63 (1976); S. REP. NO. 93-983, at 112 (1974).
42 Regrettably, Congress seems to have failed to keep the public performance
right subject matter neutral. See, e.g., 1976 Copyright Act § 110[5](A), (B) (en-
acted by the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998)).
43 It is worth noting that Egyptian law uses the term “author” and “right” in the
singular and this has been followed here.
44 Law No. 131 of 1948 (Civil Code), vol. 108bis (a) El Waqa¯i’al Misˇrı¯yah of 29
July 1948 (Egypt).
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literary and artistic works.  This was achieved with the enactment of the
Author’s Right Law of 1954.45
It is unclear whether the general principles of criminal or civil law had
offered any protection to authors against the unauthorized public per-
formance of their works before the enactment of the Author’s Right Law
of 1954.  This is mainly because, until 1949 Egypt had two main systems of
courts operating in parallel: Mixed Courts and National Courts.46
While National Courts seemed reluctant to extend the application of
the Penal Code of 1937 to protect authors and composers against the un-
authorized public performance of their works,47 the Mixed Courts were
too willing to offer such protection.48  In doing so, the Mixed Courts seem
to have created a superficial distinction between the unauthorized public
performance and the unauthorised reproduction of works.  Whereas an
unauthorized public performance would automatically trigger the applica-
tion of the Penal Code, the application of that Code to unauthorized re-
productions was conditional on the enactment of a specific author’s right
law.49  Since no such law was enacted until 1954, five years after the Mixed
Courts had been abolished, it seems that the automatic application of the
Penal Code was never extended to cover unauthorized reproductions.
Similarly, civil law protection seems to have only been offered by the
Mixed Courts. In 1931, the Alexandria Mixed Court of Appeal extended
the protection of civil law to protect authors and composers against the
unauthorized public performance of their works.  In reaching its decision,
the Court based its judgement on the general principles of “natural law
45 Law No. 354 of 1954 (enacted on 24 June 1954), vol. 49bis El Waqa¯i’al Misˇ-
rı¯yah of 24 June 1954 (Egypt).
46 The Mixed Courts began operating in 1876.  These Courts exercised jurisdic-
tion over all matters involving foreign elements.  As a result of the Montreux Con-
vention of 1937, between Egypt and the European powers, the Mixed Courts were
abolished.  However, the Convention provided for a transition period of twelve
years, after which Egypt would assume full sovereignty over its legal system.  Thus,
all the functions of the Mixed Courts were transferred to National Courts in 1949.
For the development and scope of jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts, see MARK
HOYLE, MIXED COURTS OF EGYPT (1991).  It is worth noting that in addition to
the Mixed Courts and National Courts, there were Consular Courts and various
Religious Tribunals for personal status matters operating in Egypt.  For an over-
view of the courts’ system in Egypt before 1949, see Herbert J. Liebesny, The De-
velopment of Western Judicial Privileges, in LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 330-32
(Majid Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955).
47 Law No. 58 of 1937, El Waqa¯i’al Misˇrı¯yah El Waqae art. 351 of Aug. 1937
(Egypt).
48 33 Mixed Courts Gaz. 135, 4 Jan. 1941.
49 MOHAMMED HOSSAM LOUTFI, HAQ EL ADA EL ALANY LEL MOUSANAFAT EL
MOUSIQEYA 12 (1987).
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and justice.”50  Unfortunately, no cases of unauthorized public perform-
ance seem to have been filed with National Courts.
The Mixed Courts’ willingness to protect authors and composers
against the unauthorized public performance of their works stemmed
mainly from the specific purpose for which these courts were established:
to have jurisdiction over all matters involving foreign interest.  In the
handful of cases where the public performance issue was raised, the plain-
tiff was either SACEM or a foreign author or composer.  Unsurprisingly,
therefore, the Mixed Courts were determined to extend the scope of the
law to protect foreign claimants.
With the enactment of the Author’s Right Law of 1954, all  provisions
covering literary and artistic works in the Criminal Code were repealed.51
As a result, the 1954 Law became the only source for the protection of
authorship.  Article six of that Law offered national and foreign authors,
residing in Egypt, the exclusive right of public performance.  The legisla-
ture, however, decided to use a subject-matter specific terminology.  Ac-
cordingly, authors were granted the exclusive right to authorize the public
recitation of literary works, public performance of musical works, and
public representation of dramatic works.
Shortly after the coming into force of the 1954 Law, Egyptian authors
and composers took the lead in convincing publishers of the importance of
establishing a collecting society to administer the newly recognized public
performance right.  As a result, in 1960, with the help of SACEM,52 the
Societe´ des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de la Republique Arabe
Unis (“SACERAU”) was established.
In order to ratify TRIPs and to replace the fragmented and outdated
provisions of the 1954 Law, Egypt enacted its new Intellectual Property
Code in 2002 (“IP Code”).53  Interestingly, unlike the U.S. Copyright Act,
which lists the author’s exclusive economic rights in the form of an exhaus-
tive list, the Egyptian legislature elected to give authors full control over
the exploitation of their works and did not commit to a specific number of
economic rights.  According to Article 147 of the IP Code:
[T]he author and his successor in title shall have the exclusive right to
authorize or prevent any form of exploitation of his work, particularly
through reproduction, broadcasting, re-broadcasting, public performance,
communication to the public, translation, adaptation, rental, lending or
making the work available to the public in any manner, including through
50 Decision of 16th Feb. 1931, 82 Bull. SACEM 46 (1931).
51 Author’s Right Law, No. 354 for 1954 art. 51 (Egypt).
52 It is worth noting that SACEM has had a representative office in Egypt since
1884.
53 Law No. 82 of 2002 (Intellectual Property Code), 22bis al Jarı¯dah al-Rasymah,
2nd of June 2002 (entered into force on June 3, 2002).
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computers, internet, information networks, communication networks and
other means.
The poor drafting of the economic rights provision of Article 147
leaves much to be desired.  While it does not mention specific exclusive
rights,54 the above provision adopts a non-exhaustive list of modes of ex-
ploitation that fall within the author’s prerogative.  However, in classifying
public performance, communication to the public and reproduction as
modes of exploitation, the legislature seems to be self- contradictory.  This
is especially so, since those same terms were treated under the definition
provision of Article 138 of the IP Code as economic rights.
III. THE EVOLUTION AND SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE RIGHT UNDER THE BERNE
CONVENTION
From its conception, the Berne Convention was based on two basic
principles: national treatment and minimum rights.55  The first Conference
for the Berne Convention of 1886 failed to introduce the public perform-
ance right as one of the minimum rights specifically recognized under the
Convention.  However, Article 9 extended the application of the national
treatment provision of Article 2 to cover the public performance of dra-
matic, musical and dramatico-musical works of authors of the Union.56
Therefore, although under the 1886 Act, the public performance right was
not recognized as one of the minimum rights, it was still covered by the
national treatment principle.  As such, if a member country did not recog-
nize a public performance right in its own national law, there was no obli-
gation under the Convention for that country to protect foreign authors of
the Berne Union against the public performance of their works.57
54 Fahmy v. Jay-Z, No. 2:07-cv-05715-CAS (PJWx), 2015 WL 7280761 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 29, 2015).  Although this is a U.S. case, the applicable law was that of Egypt.
55 The Berne Convention, often referred to as the Berne Union, was established
on September 9, 1886.  However, Article 17 of the 1886 Act provided for periodic
revisions and these have taken place roughly every twenty years.  The first revision
took place in Berlin in 1908 (the Berlin Act), followed by Rome in 1928 (the Rome
Act), Brussels in 1948 (the Brussels Act), Stockholm in 1967 (the Stockholm Act),
and Paris in 1971 (the Paris Act).  It is also worth noting that an Additional Act
was attached to the Convention in 1896 together with an Additional Protocol in
1914.
56 For an author to become “an author of the Union” or “unionist” according to
Articles 2 and 3 of the 1886 text of the Convention, he or she had to meet one of
the two following requirements: citizenship of a member country or if the author
did not belong to a member country, first publication in a country of the Union
through a publisher [sic] that belonged to a Union country.
57 STEPHAN LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND AR-
TISTIC PROPERTY 396 (1938).
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The original text of 1886, however, made a distinction between the
application of the national treatment principle to dramatic and dramatico-
musical works on the one hand and musical works on the other.58  For
dramatic and dramatico-musical works, the national treatment principle
applied without any further qualification.  Accordingly, a Berne member
that recognized in its own national law a public performance right of dra-
matic or dramatico-musical works was required to extend such protection
to all foreign authors of the Berne Union.  As for musical works, the appli-
cation of the national treatment principle was subject to a formality re-
quirement: the author had to explicitly forbid the public performance of
his or her work by fixing a notice to that effect on the title page of the
sheet music.59
It could be argued that such a distinction was specifically introduced
to accommodate the needs of some national laws.  For instance, in order to
put an end to Thomas Wall’s vexatious proceedings,60 the UK law adopted
the notice requirement in 1882 as a prerequisite for the exercise of the
public performance right in musical works.61
The distinction made between protecting dramatic or dramatico-musi-
cal works on the one hand and musical works on the other was challenged
during the debates leading to the Additional Act of Paris 1896.  France
and Belgium proposed abolishing the formality requirement, which hith-
erto was a prerequisite for the application of the national treatment princi-
ple to the public performance of musical works.  As a result of the
objections raised by the United Kingdom and Germany, which at the time
recognized such formality requirement under their national laws, the pro-
posal was rejected.62
58 Berne Convention 1886 art. 9.
59 Even in respect of dramatic and dramatico-musical works, it was still permissi-
ble for countries of the Union to retain the notice requirement, provided that such
formality requirement applied equally to national and foreign authors of the
Union.
60 Thomas Wall, also known as Harry Wall, was a Common Informer, who took
proceedings for infringements of certain statutes solely for the penalty, or share
thereof, which by the Act fell to one who gave information of a breach. See
Makeen, supra note 20, at 121.
61 Musical Compositions Copyright Act 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 40.
62 ACTES DE LA CONFE´RENCE DE PARIS RE´UNIE A PARIS DU 15 AVRIL AU 4 MAI
1896, at 172 (Berne, Bureau International  de l’Union 1897).  However, upon the
insistence of some delegates, the Records of the Conference included Resolution
No. 11, or a voeu expressing hope, that national laws should abolish the formality
requirement by the time of the next revision in Berlin. See id. at 229, republished
in THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS 1886 TO 1986 (1986), ftp://ftp.wipo.int/pub/library/ebooks/wipopublica-
tions/wipo_pub_877e.pdf.
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Arguably, abolishing the notice requirement, as a perquisite for the
application of the national treatment principle to public performance of
musical works under the Berne Convention, would not have prevented the
UK and Germany from retaining that requirement under their national
laws, provided that it would have applied to national and foreign authors
equally.  This is especially so, since at the time, the Convention said noth-
ing about compliance with the formality requirements in the country
where protection was claimed as a prerequisite for the application of the
national treatment.63  Even the binding effect of Article 1 of the 1896 In-
terpretative Declaration,64 which stipulated that the application of the na-
tional treatment principle was subject solely to the compliance with the
formalities in the country of origin and not where protection is claimed,
was questionable.  As Ricketson points out: “it was, of course, open to any
state to refuse to sign the Declaration, and to apply a more restrictive
interpretation of Article 2(2) to Convention works.”65
Be that as it may, by the time of the Berlin Revision Conference of
1908, judicial controversies had arisen as to the proper form of notice and
whether it should be in the language of the country of origin or in that of
the country where protection is sought and whether extracts of musical
parts of dramatico-musical works should bear the notice.66  As a result,
the German delegation proposed the deletion of the formality require-
ment as a precondition for the application of the national treatment princi-
ple to public performance of musical works.67  The proposal was received
favorably, and there was general agreement that the time was ripe to abol-
ish the notice requirement.  Accordingly, the Berlin Act added a new par-
agraph to the public performance provision, which now became Article 11,
and stipulated: “In order to enjoy the protection of this Article, authors in
publishing their works are not obliged to prohibit the public presentation
or public performance of them.”
This new paragraph of Article 11, combined with the new provision of
Article 4 (later to become Article 5), which introduced a general prohibi-
63 For a different interpretation, see CHARLES SOLDAN, L’UNION INTERNATIO-
NALE POUR LA PROTECTION DES OEUVRES LITTE´RAIRES ET ARTISTIQUE 407 (Paris,
Thorin 1888).
64 “Aux termes de l’article 2, aline´a 2, de la Convention, la protection assure´e par
les actes pre´cite´s de´pend uniquement de l’accomplissement dans le pays d’origine
de l’oeuvre, des conditions et formalite´s qui peuvent eˆtre prescrites par la le´gisla-
tion de ce pays.”
65 SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITER-
ARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986, at 202 (1987).
66 For the controversy that surrounded the language of the notice in the UK, see
Sarpy v. Holland, (1908) L.T. 317 (Ct. App.).
67 STEPHAN LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND AR-
TISTIC PROPERTY 397 (1938).
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tion against formalities, finally abolished the odd distinction between the
automatic application of the national treatment principle to public per-
formance of dramatic and dramatico-musical works and the subjecting of
that same principle to the formality requirement in respect of musical
works.  As a result, no country ratifying the 1908 Act of the Berne Con-
vention could require a notice of reservation as a precondition for the ap-
plication of the national treatment principle to the public performance of
musical works.68
During the Rome Revision Conference of 1928, the Irish Free State
insisted that the wording of Article 11 should be clarified to make it clear
that the public performance right was one of the minimum rights specifi-
cally recognized under the Convention.69  Upon the objection of Austra-
lia, Norway and New Zealand, which feared that such recognition would
play into the hands of the monopolistic positions enjoyed by collecting
societies, the wording of Article 11 was left unchanged.70  As a result,
under the 1928 Rome Act of the Convention, as it was the case with previ-
ous Acts, the public performance right was covered solely by the national
treatment principle.
At the 1948 Brussels Conference, the Bureaux Internationaux Re´unis
pour la Protection de la Proprie´te´ Intellectuelle (“BIRPI”), through the
Belgian government, proposed the recognition of the public performance
right as one of the minimum rights specifically recognized under the Con-
vention.  For a group of countries, such as Belgium, no restrictions were to
be recognized in the Convention to limit the scope of the proposed exclu-
sive right.  For another group of countries, the scope of the new right was
best left to national legislation, which may prefer to exempt public festi-
vals, religious and/or charitable performances from the scope of the public
performance right.  Accordingly, a compromise about the scope of the
public performance right had to be reached.
The compromise took the form of recognizing public performance as
one of the minimum rights in the text of the Convention, but simultane-
68 Strangely enough, whilst the Berlin Act of 1908 did not recognize a general
public performance right as one of the minimum rights under the Convention, Ar-
ticles 13(1) and 14(1) recognized the exclusive right of public performance of musi-
cal works by means of instruments, which reproduced them mechanically and by
means of cinematography, respectively.
69 CONFE´RENCE INTERNATIONALE POUR LA PROTECTION DES OEUVRES LITTE´R-
AIRES ET ARTISTIQUES; INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITER-
ARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS, ACTES DE LA CONFE´RENCE RE´UNIE A` ROME, DU 7
MAI AU 2 JUIN 1928, at 222 (1929).
70 Id. at 255. Australia and New Zealand felt that introducing public perform-
ance as one of the minimum rights specifically recognised under the Convention
may hinder their ability to take measures against the abuse of dominant position
enjoyed by collecting societies.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\65-2\CPY202.txt unknown Seq: 15  2-AUG-18 14:03
The Public Performance Right of Musical Works 183
ously qualifying the scope of the general right by adding a statement to the
Records of the Conference permitting national laws to subject that right to
“minor exceptions.”  Therefore, Article 11 was amended to read:
1. Authors of dramatic, dramatico-musical or musical works shall en-
joy the exclusive right of authorising:
1- the public presentation and public performance of their works;
2- the public distribution by any means of the presentation and perform-
ance of their works.
2. Authors of dramatic or dramatico-musical works, during the full
term of their rights over the original works, shall enjoy the same right
with respect to translations thereof.
3. In order to enjoy the protection of this Article, authors shall not
be bound, when publishing their works, to forbid the public presentation
or performance thereof.
Had that provision stood alone, it would have been unlikely to be
adopted.  This is especially so, since some countries insisted on retaining
their ability to maintain, or introduce, exceptions or limitations to restrict
the scope of the new exclusive right.  Therefore, upon the introduction of
the public performance right, a statement was included in the General Re-
port of the Brussels Conference, by Marcel Plaisant the General Rap-
porteur, concerning the minor exceptions doctrine and its application to
the newly recognized right.  This Statement read:
Your Rapporteur-General has been entrusted with making an express
mention of the possibility available to national legislation to make what
are commonly called minor reservations.  The Delegates of Norway, Swe-
den, Denmark, and Finland, the Delegate of Switzerland and the Dele-
gate of Hungary, have all mentioned these limited exceptions allowed for
religious ceremonies, military bands and the needs of the child and adult
education.  These exceptional measures apply to articles 11bis, 11ter, 13
and 14.  You will understand that these references are just lightly pen-
cilled in here, in order to avoid damaging the principles of the right.71
Although the above statement was an integral part of the compro-
mise, three factors seem to have undermined its value.  First, while Marcel
Plaisant’s statement was mainly concerned with the public performance
right, the statement did not mention its applicability to the newly
recognised general public performance right of Article 11 of the Berne
71 INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS, DOCUMENTS DE LA CONFE´RENCE RE´UNIE A` BRUXELLES, DU 5 AU 26 JUIN
1948, Berne, International Office 100 (1951) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS DE LA CON-
FERENCE].  Parts of the Records of the Brussels Conference were recently made
available online in English. See Records of the Conference Convened in Brussels
June 5 to 26, 1948, at 263,   http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/Records_of_the_
Conference_1948_Brussels_Revisions.pdf; see also WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY ORG., THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS 1886 TO 1986, at 181 (1986), ftp://ftp.wipo.int/pub/library/ebooks/
wipopublications/wipo_pub_877(e).pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\65-2\CPY202.txt unknown Seq: 16  2-AUG-18 14:03
184 Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
Convention.  Second, the wording of the minor exceptions doctrine did
not make it clear whether Plainsant’s statement reflected a general agree-
ment among delegates or only the views of those countries specifically
mentioned, which could automatically undermine its binding effect. Third,
for a long time, this minor exception doctrine was dormant at the interna-
tional level.72  However, all doubt surrounding Plaisant’s statement was
removed with the WTO Panel Report of 2000, on § 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act, which confirmed the existence and binding effect of the
minor exceptions doctrine.73  Furthermore, the WTO Panel Report gave a
wide interpretation to the minor exceptions doctrine, as it applies to the
public performance right, so as to cover commercial as well as non-com-
mercial use.74
Under the Stockholm Act of 1967, the spirit of Article 11 remained
substantially the same as was under the 1948 Brussels Act.  However, in
order to make it absolutely clear that the public performance right under
the Convention covers not only performances by human performers but
also those given through electric or mechanical devices, the Stockholm
Act amended the wording of Article 11 by adding “including such public
performance by any means or process.”  Furthermore, by the time of the
Stockholm Act, automatic protection was a well-established concept under
Article 5 of the Convention, and therefore it was felt unnecessary to main-
tain the declaratory paragraph of Article 11, which prohibited the compli-
ance with formalities as a prerequisite for the application of the national
treatment principle to cover the public performance right.
The wording adopted in Stockholm was left intact by the 1971 Paris
Act and therefore Article 11, as it stands today, states:
72 Also known as the “minor reservation doctrine.”
73 The Final Report was made available to all parties on May 5, 2000, and in
accordance with the WTO rules, was circulated unrestrictedly on June 15, 2000.
For the Panel report, see WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNITED STATES – SEC-
TION 110(5) OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT ACT paras. 6.45, 6.53, 6.60, 6.63 (2000), http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/1234da.pdf [hereinafter PANEL REPORT].
For a detailed analysis of the Panel’s approach, see Makeen F. Makeen, The Re-
ception in Public Dilemma Under U.S. Copyright Law, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
355, 396-419 (2011).
74 The Panel stated “At any rate, in our view, a non-commercial character of the
use in question is not determinative provided that the exception contained in na-
tional law is indeed minor.” PANEL REPORT, supra note 73, para. 6.57.  For the
history of the minor exceptions doctrine, see SAM RICKETSON, WIPO STUDY ON
LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE DIG-
ITAL ENVIRONMENT  33-37 (2003), http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp
?doc_id=16805 (submitted to the Ninth Session of the Standing Committee on
Copyright and Related Rights, Geneva, 23-27 June, 2003, Document No. SCCR/9/
7).
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(1) Authors of dramatic, dramatico-musical and musical works shall
enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing:
(i) the public performance of their works, including such public per-
formance by any means or process;
(ii) any communication to the public of the performance of their
works.
(2) Authors of dramatic or dramatico-musical works shall enjoy, dur-
ing the full term of their rights in the original works, the same rights with
respect to translations thereof.
It is regrettable that the text of the Berne Convention failed to deal
with the public performance right in a coherent manner.  As the text
stands today, there are five different provisions, four of which are subject
matter-specific, governing the public performance right.  The four subject
matter-specific provisions are: Article 11(1)(i) which covers dramatic, dra-
matico-musical, and musical works; Article 11ter(1)(i) which covers the
public recitation of literary works; Article 14(1)(ii) which covers works
adapted or reproduced by cinematography; and Article 14 bis([1) which
covers the public performance of cinematographic works.  In addition to
the subject matter-specific provisions, Article 11bis(1)(iii) covers the re-
ception in public of all literary and artistic works.
It is worth noting that under the Berne Convention, a distinction is
maintained between communication in public, i.e., a public performance
before a gathered audience, and communication to the public, i.e., a com-
munication of the work to people geographically dispersed by broadcast-
ing, cabling and simultaneous cable retransmission or rebroadcasting.
Whilst the communication to the public rights of Article 11bis may be sub-
ject to a compulsory licensing mechanism, no such restriction is permitted
under the communication in public provisions of Articles 11(1)(i),
11ter(1)(i), 14(1)(ii), and 14bis(1).  Unfortunately, the Berne Convention
failed to be consistent throughout and wrongly placed the reception in
public provision under Article 11bis, which is mainly concerned with the
communication to the public.75
Unlike all other rights recognized under Article 11bis, the reception
in public does not involve the communication of works to people geo-
graphically dispersed or the communication of works between two distant
points.  Similar to playing a vinyl record or a CD in public where the per-
formance takes place through a record or CD player, in regard of the re-
ception in public, the performance originates from the receiving set.  As
such, the reception in public is a performance before a gathered audience,
i.e., communication in public.76  Not only does this interpretation reflect
the approach of most national laws at the time of adopting that provision
75 MAKEEN, supra note 38, at 77-78.
76 Unfortunately, as a result of the CJEU decision in FAPL v. QC Leisure, the
EU communication to the public right was unnecessarily extended to cover the
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in 1948,77 but it is also supported by Masouye´’s WIPO Guide to the Berne
Convention.78
Moreover, the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 provides support to this
interpretation.  While enumerating all the communication to the public
provisions of the Berne Convention, the “without prejudice clause” of Ar-
ticle 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty left out the reception in public provi-
sion of Article 11bis(1)(iii).79  Therefore, the wording of Article 8 of the
WIPO Copyright Treaty makes it absolutely clear that the reception in
public is a type of communication in public that falls outside the scope of
the general communication to the public right of that Treaty.
It could be argued that the natural place for the reception in public
provision should have been under Article 11(1)(i) of the Berne Conven-
tion.  There are a number of reasons why this was not the case.  First, as
mentioned above, Article 11 is a subject matter-specific provision and
therefore introducing the reception in public under that provision would
not have covered all works.  Accordingly, a similar provision would have
been required to be inserted under Articles 11ter(1)(i), 14(1)(ii), and
14bis(1).
Secondly, at the time of introducing the reception in public provision
in 1948, the wording of Article 11(1)(i) of the Convention was slightly in-
adequate, since it failed to explicitly cover performances by mechanical or
electronic devices.  As discussed above, it was not until the 1967 Stock-
holm Act that the wording was changed to include “such public perform-
ance by any means or process.”  Thirdly, introducing the reception in
public provision under Article 11bis was probably to reflect the wish of the
delegates at the Brussels Conference to have all issues relating to broad-
casting under a single provision.  This is especially so, since unlike all other
reception in public of copyright works. See joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08
(2011) E.C.R. 1-9083; (2012) 1 C.M.L.R. 29.
77 For an example of a contemporary copyright law that classifies the reception in
public as a type of public performance, as opposed to communication to the public,
see UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 § 19.
78 CLAUDE MASOUYE´, WIPO GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION 69 (William
Wallace trans., 1978) (“Once this reception is done in order to entertain a wider
circle, often for profit, an additional section of the public is enabled to enjoy the
work and it ceases to be merely a matter of broadcasting.  The author is given
control over this new public performance of his work.” (emphasis added)).
79 Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty states:
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and
(ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors
of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorising
any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless
means, including the making available to the public of their works in such
a way that members of the public may access these works from a place
and at a time individually chosen by them.
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provisions that deal with the dissemination of works in non-material form,
Article 11bis is subject matter- neutral and therefore covers all types of
literary and artistic works.
Notwithstanding the existence of five different Articles to cover the
communication in public or the public performance right under the Berne
Convention, not a single provision defines the term “public,” or even pro-
vides national laws with guidelines on how to distinguish between public
and private performances.  Similarly, with the exception of a single para-
graph in the 1948 Brussels Documents, which makes it clear that: “it did
not suffice that the performance, representation or recitation was ‘without
the aim of profit’ for it to escape the exclusive right of the author,”
records of the Revision Conferences do not offer any assistance.80  There-
fore, it is left for national laws to define the term “public” and to identify
the different criteria upon which such determination is made.
IV. THE PUBLIC REQUIREMENT UNDER U.S. AND EGYPTIAN
LAWS
While under the U.S. Copyright Act of 1909 the term “performance”
was left undefined, § 101 of the 1976 Act defines the term “to perform a
work” as “to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by
means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the
sounds accompanying it audible.”  Therefore, unlike Egyptian law, as will
be discussed below, this definition makes it clear that a performance may
be accomplished either directly or by means of any device or process, in-
cluding all kinds of equipment for reproducing or amplifying sounds or
visual images.81
It was widely accepted under the U.S. Copyright Act of 1909 that a
performance open to the public at large constituted a public performance.
Similarly, it was widely accepted that a performance within a family circle
fell outside the scope of the public performance right.82  However, the
controversial issue under that Act concerned performances given in so-
80 Sur la proposition du rapporteur de la Sous-Commission, M. Walckiers, la
Confe´rence marqua toutefois que les limitations avaient un caracte`re
restreint et qu’en particulier, il ne suffisait pas que l’exe´cution, repre´sen-
tation, re´citation fussent ”sans but de lucre” pour qu’elles e´chappassent
au droit exclusif de l’auteur.
DOCUMENTS DE LA CONFERENCE, supra note 71, at 264.
81 S. REP. NO. 93-983, at 113 (1974); H. R. REP. NO., 94-1476, at 63 (1976).
82 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 107.21, at 400 (1966).  In ex-
plaining the exemption of private performances from copyright liability, Drone
states, “[t]he purpose of the law is to protect the lawful owner of a dramatic com-
position from injury.  Ordinarily, no injury will arise from the strictly private repre-
sentation of a play. EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
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called “semi-public places,” such as private clubs or factories, where ad-
mission is given only to a segment of the public.
The controversy stemmed mainly from the failure of the 1909 Act to
define the term “public.”  In the absence of a statutory definition of the
term “public,” courts were saddled with the burden of construing the term;
they did so inconsistently. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distribution Corp. v.
Wyatt, where a performance was given at a yacht club for members and
their guests, it was held that the performance was not in public.83  This
decision seems to have defined the term “public place” to mean a place
which offers entrance to anyone without restriction.84  However, in Porter
v. Marriott Motor Hotels85 and Lerner v. Schectman, the opposite conclu-
sion was reached.86
As a result of the courts’ difficulty in defining the term “public” under
the 1909 Act, the 1976 Act endeavoured to provide a uniform standard.
Accordingly, § 101 states that:
To perform or display a work “publicly” means—
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a
family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the
work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiv-
INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 627
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1879).
83 21 C.O. Bull. 203 (D.C. Md. 1932).  In France, the Court of Cassation reached
a similar decision and extended the meaning of the term private to include not
only members of the same society, but also their guests provided that the perform-
ance was: gratuitous; organized by the society; and the guests were nominated by
name and identified in advance. See Cass. Req., 23 jan. 1907, Gaz. Pal. 1907. 1.
473.
84 Adam Barrett Townshend, Note, Crashing by Design: Toward a Uniform Stan-
dard for Public Place Analysis Under Federal Copyright Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2045, 2051 (2004).
85 137 U.S.P.Q. 473 (N.D. Tex. 1962).  This case concerned the unauthorised per-
formance of a musical work in the Sirloin & Saddle Club at the Marriot Hotel,
where only people staying in the hotel and their guests could attend.
86 228 F. Supp. 354 (D. Minn. 1964).  This case concerned the unauthorized per-
formance of September Song, How High the Moon, and My Funny Valentine in The
Apartment night club, where only members and their guests were allowed to at-
tend.  In reaching its conclusion that such a performance amounted to a public
performance, the court stated that: “[I]t is not necessary that the performance be
made to the general public in order that the statute be violated.  Nor do we read
the law to require that the performance be theoretically accessible to the entire
general public.” Id. at 355.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\65-2\CPY202.txt unknown Seq: 21  2-AUG-18 14:03
The Public Performance Right of Musical Works 189
ing the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times.87
According to this definition, the public requirement is governed by
three criteria: a place open to the public (hereinafter referred to as the
nature of the place); any place where a substantial number of persons
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gath-
ered (hereinafter referred to as the nature of the gathering); and the
transmission clause.  Since this article is solely concerned with the commu-
nication in public, the transmission clause, which comes into play only in
the context of communication to the public, falls outside the scope of this
study.  Thus, only the nature of the place and the nature of the gathering
will be discussed here.
From the outset, it should be noted that the two components of the
nature of the place and the nature of the gathering are disjunctive.  As
such, they need not apply cumulatively for the performance to be consid-
ered “public.”  Put differently, falling within the scope of either criterion
makes the performance a public one that requires the authorization of the
copyright owner.
In adopting the criterion of “a place open to the public,” Congress
clearly intended the nature of the place to be determinative.  Unfortu-
nately, however, Congress failed to define the term “place open to the
public,” which led one commentator to argue that the “1976 Act leaves us
in the same position as the 1909 Act.”88  Accordingly, it was left to courts
to define the term “place open to the public” and to determine its scope.
In Columbia Pictures Industries v. Redd Horne, Inc.,89 the defendant
operated a store containing a small showroom area at the front and small
private booths at the rear.  The different booths had space for two to four
people and each had a nineteen-inch color television.  A customer wishing
to use one of the viewing booths would select a film from the store’s cata-
logue and pay the appropriate fee.  An employee of the store would then
place the chosen cassette in the VCR player located at the front of the
store and the film would be transmitted to the customer’s viewing booth.
While the store was open to any member of the public, access to each
booth was restricted to the individual or individuals who rented it.  Al-
though no restriction was placed on the composition of a group, strangers
were not grouped together in order to fill the capacity of a particular
booth.  The plaintiff argued that the showing of the films in the private
booths amounted to an unauthorized public performance.
87 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
88 Townshend, supra note 84, at 2056.
89 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
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In reaching its decision that the defendant’s activities constituted a
public performance of the plaintiff’s motion pictures, the court made it
clear that the relevant “place” was the store as a whole and not each indi-
vidual booth.  The court went further and stated that “simply because the
cassettes can be viewed in private does not mitigate the essential fact that
Maxwell’s [the store] is unquestionably open to the public.”90  Since any
member of the public could view a film in the store by paying the required
fee, the court concluded that the services provided by the defendant were
essentially the same as a movie theatre.  Although the court did not define
the term “place open to the public,” it seems to have used it to mean a
place to which the public have “access” or a place accessible to the public.
Shortly after its decision in Redd Horne, the Third Circuit had to
tackle the same question again in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v.
Aveco, Inc.91 The facts were very similar to those of Redd Horne, save that
in Aveco (a) the VCR players were located in the individual rooms
(booths) and not at the front of the store, which allowed the customer to
have complete control over the process without any intervention from the
store’s employees; and (b) customers could either rent a video cassette
from the store or bring a video cassette obtained elsewhere to play in the
private room.92
Aveco pointed to the above two differences to distinguish Redd
Horne from its own factual context.  In rejecting the defendant’s argu-
ment, the court stated that: “[t]he necessary implication of Aveco’s analy-
sis is that Redd Horne would have been decided differently had Maxwell’s
[the store] located its video cassette players in a locked closet in the back
of the store.  We do not read Redd Horne to adopt such an analysis.”93
The court went on to say that “our opinion in Redd Horne turned not on
the precise whereabouts of the video cassette player, but on the nature of
Maxwell’s stores,”94 i.e., the nature of the place.
The court made it clear that while the Copyright Act speaks of per-
formances at a place open to the public, it does not require that the public
place be crowded with people.  The court employed analogical reasoning
and referred to telephone booths, taxi cabs, and pay toilets, which are
commonly regarded as places open to the public, notwithstanding that
they are normally occupied by only one party at a time.  Since Aveco was
willing to make its viewing rooms available to any member of the public,
this availability made the store a public place.  Accordingly, the court held
90 Id. at 159.
91 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
92 Id. at 61.
93 Id. at 63.
94 Id.
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that Aveco’s operations constituted infringement by authorizing the public
performance of the plaintiff’s motion pictures.
While a similar reasoning was adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Red
Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp.,95 a different approach seems to
have been adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Columbia Pictures Industries v.
Professional Real Estate.96  The question before the court was whether a
hotel was unlawfully authorizing the public performance of the plaintiff’s
motion pictures when it rented videodiscs to guests to view on the video
players installed in the hotel rooms.  The court gave answer in the negative
and ruled that the viewing of videodiscs in hotel rooms was private per-
formance, exempted from copyright liability.
While acknowledging that a hotel may indeed be a place “open to the
public,” the Ninth Circuit pointed out that “a guest’s hotel room, once
rented, is not.”97  The court seems to have based its reasoning on U.S.
constitutional law, namely that the Fourth Amendment protection from
unreasonable search and seizure extends to a guest’s hotel room.  Further,
the court remarked that guest rooms are places where individuals enjoy a
substantial degree of privacy, not unlike their own homes.
Strangely enough, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Professional Real
Estate from Redd Horne and Aveco using the nature of the business or the
primary source of revenue as a criterion.98  While in Redd Horne and
Aveco the businesses were established to rent video cassettes, equipment
and rooms in which the customers could watch the motion pictures, in
Professional Real Estate, the main business was providing accommodation
and hotel services.  Thus, the court concluded that rental of videodiscs to
interested guests for viewing in guest rooms was incidental to the main
activities of the hotel.  The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit is difficult to
follow.99  This is especially so, since it seems to have introduced the “na-
ture of the business” as an additional criterion, which cannot be supported
by the plain language of the Act or its legislative history.
Shortly after the decisions of the Third, Fourth and Ninth Circuits, it
was the Seventh Circuit’s turn to voice its opinion on the matter.  In Video
Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., the defendant owned and operated an adult
bookstore, with six video arcade booths.100  Each booth could accommo-
95 883 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1989).
96 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989).
97 Id. at 281.
98 Id.
99 For the same meaning, see Roger W. Wallach, Not in Public! The Ninth Circuit
Devises a Two-Step Test for Public Performances Under the Copyright Act, Colum-
bia Pictures Industries v. Professional Real Estate Investors, 68 WASH. U. L.Q.
203, 210 (1990).
100 925 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1991)
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\65-2\CPY202.txt unknown Seq: 24  2-AUG-18 14:03
192 Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
date a maximum of six people and in which customers, after purchasing
tokens, could view segments of selected adult films.  The defendant argued
that Professional Real Estate had changed the law and that the approach
adopted by the Third Circuit in Redd Horne and Aveco should not be
followed.
Although the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Studio 21 covered a num-
ber of issues, the scope of the public performance right was dealt with
briefly in two short paragraphs.  The Court opined that the 1976 Copyright
Act contemplated a broad interpretation of the concept of public perform-
ance.  Accordingly, it adopted the Third Circuit’s approach and followed
its analysis of the nature of the place.  While rejecting the defendant’s pro-
position that Professional Real Estate had changed the law, the Court went
further and made it clear that “to the extent that Professional Real Estate
may be viewed to contradict the rule established by Redd Horne and
Aveco, we decline to follow it.”101
Notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit’s statement: “[w]e find that Pro-
fessional Real Estate Investors did not change the law,”102 it is difficult to
reconcile the approach adopted by the Third, Fourth and Seventh Circuits
with that of the Ninth Circuit.103  While the holdings of the Third, Fourth
and Seventh Circuits make it clear that no private spaces can exist in
places open to the public, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclu-
sion in respect to hotel rooms.  As such, the latter’s approach seems to be
in direct conflict with the approach adopted by the other three circuits.
It could be argued that in today’s world, the importance of the Ninth
Circuit decision in Professional Real Estate is fading away.  At present,
video on demand, where the signals carrying copyrighted works are dis-
tributed by wire or wireless means to individual recipients, has replaced
the renting of video cassettes or discs to hotel guests.  Such a distribution
amounts to a communication to the public, which although falls outside
the scope of this article, comes within the scope of the transmission clause
101 Id. at 1020.
102 Id.
103 Attempting to reconcile these decisions, Adam Barrett Townshend suggested a
three-pronged public place standard:
(1) whether the immediate space in which the performance takes place
affords its occupant a reasonable expectation of privacy; (2) whether the
individual (or individuals) witnessing the performance controls that per-
formance, or whether that individual (or individuals) lacks control over
the performance; and (3) whether the nature of the place in which the
performance takes place is generally used for the purpose of enjoying
such performances, or whether the performance is incidental to the over-
all function of the enterprise.
Townsend, supra note 84, at 2063.
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of the definition of “public performance.”104  Thus, in On Command
Video v. Columbia Pictures,105 where a hotel delivered unlicensed movies
electronically to hotel rooms upon the occupants’ request, it was held that
the hotel’s actions constituted an unauthorized public performance under
the transmission clause.106
It is submitted that the advent of electronic delivery or video on de-
mand seems to have rendered the holding in Professional Real Estate of
little relevance.  Therefore, in assessing the nature of the place, the acces-
sibility of the place to the public, or the “availability” as the Aveco court
put it, seems to be decisive.  As such, the term “public place” is not synon-
ymous with the statutory language of “a place open to the public.”  This is
mainly because a place could be public by nature, yet inaccessible to mem-
bers of the public at the time of the performance.  This interpretation is
supported by the decision of the Eighth Circuit in National Football
League v. McBee & Bruno’s, Inc.,107 where it was held that a performance
before the owner of a bar and his three friends during hours in which the
bar was closed to the public did not constitute a public performance.
In addition to the nature of the place, the 1976 Act adopted the na-
ture of the gathering as a separate and independent criterion for the appli-
cation of the public performance right.  If the place is accessible to the
public, then the nature of the gathering criterion is otiose.  However, if the
place is not accessible to the public, the nature of the gathering is
determinative.
The criterion of the nature of the gathering was introduced specifi-
cally to expand the concept of public performance by including places that,
although not open to the public, are accessible to a significant number of
people.  The legislative history indicates that in adopting this criterion,
Congress’ aim was to make clear that, contrary to the decision in Metro-
Goldwyn Mayer Distributing Corp. v. Wyatt (discussed above), perform-
ances in “semi-public” places, such as clubs, lodges, factories, summer
camps, and schools are public performances subject to copyright
control.108
The statutory language “at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances
is gathered” indicates that the nature of the gathering comprises size and
composition.  Accordingly, the nature of the gathering seems to incorpo-
104 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
105 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
106 The court added that the insertion of “at the same time or at different times”
in the definition of public performance was to cover precisely the sort of single-
viewer system used by the hotel. Id. at 790.
107 792 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986).
108 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64 (1976); S. REP. NO., 93-983, at 114 (1974).
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rate a quantitative and a qualitative standard.  The qualitative standard
invites courts to assess the nature of the relationships among those attend-
ing the performance.  Unsurprisingly, the 1976 Act, as with most modern
laws, adopted the qualitative standard of the family as the demarcation
line between private and public performance.  Thus, it could be argued
that a family exception is recognized a contrario under the 1976 Copyright
Act.
Apart from making it clear that the term family includes an individual
living alone,109 neither the Act nor its legislative history clarifies the scope
of the term “normal circle of a family.”  Daniel Cantor argues that this
term could be subject to two different interpretations:  the first indicates a
family circle and therefore only encompasses those individuals living
under one roof as a family.  An alternative interpretation could be based
on the literal approach to ascertain the true intention of the legislature:
since Congress did not use the term family circle, but rather “a normal
circle of a family,” it may have intended the term to encompass the family
circle plus all relatives normally invited into that circle.110  This latter in-
terpretation could find further support from the statutory language of “so-
cial acquaintances,” which seems to have been inserted intentionally to
expand the scope of exempted performance beyond those living under the
same roof.
The quantitative standard seems to invite courts to engage in a nu-
merical exercise.  In St. Nicholas Music, Inc. v. D.V.W., Inc., the court
found the quantitative standard to have been satisfied where twenty-three
patrons attended a performance in a private club.111  Similarly, in Fermata
International Melodies v. Champions Golf Club, it was held that a per-
formance before twenty-one members plus guests in a private golf club
amounted to a public performance.112  Although neither case is indicative
of the maximum number beyond which the performance could be classi-
fied as public, it was argued that twenty-one “strangers” should be the
outer limit.113
It is worth noting that while the statutory language of “any place”
does not restrict the applicability of the nature of the gathering criterion to
any particular place or places, it has only been applied to semi-public
109 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64 (1976).
110 Daniel Cantor, How Many Guests May Attend a Wedding Reception Before
ASCAP Shows up? Or, What Are the Limits of the Definition of Perform “Pub-
licly” Under 17 U.S.C. § 101?, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 79, 97-99 (2003).
111 CIV No. C-84-0307W, 1985 WL 9624 (D. Utah Feb. 20, 1985).
112 712 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
113 Cantor, supra note 110, at 80.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\65-2\CPY202.txt unknown Seq: 27  2-AUG-18 14:03
The Public Performance Right of Musical Works 195
places.  As yet, it has not been applied to private homes.114  This approach
seems to reflect the intention of Congress, which as discussed above was to
extend the scope of the Act to capture performances in semi-public places,
and may also explain why this criterion is often referred to in the U.S. as
the “semi-public place clause” rather than the “nature of the gathering.”
In an ideal world, any recognized copyright exception to an exclusive
right should help clarify the criteria governing the application of that right.
Unfortunately, this is not the case under the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act.  In
addition to the open-ended fair use exception of § 107, by virtue of § 110
(1)–(11) the 1976 Act recognized a number of specific public performance
exceptions to exempt certain acts of communication in public from any
copyright liability.115  The main reason for recognizing such a great num-
ber of exceptions is the unique political environment in which Congress
operates, which does not always provide solutions to copyright dilemmas
based on sound copyright policy.  It is an intensely political body, loath to
impose one-sided losses on any interest group, even if sound copyright
policy dictates that result.116
In following this approach, Congress failed to maintain any common
causality between the criteria governing the application of the public per-
formance right, i.e., nature of the place and nature of the gathering, and
the numerous exceptions recognised.  As a result, neither any individual
exception nor all the exceptions could be of any assistance in clarifying the
scope of the term “public,” and therefore will not be further discussed
here.
Unlike under U.S. copyright law, the Egyptian legislature did not de-
fine the terms “performance” and “public” separately.  Under Egyptian
law, public performance is defined as “any act through which the work is
made available to the public in any form, such as acting, declaiming, play-
ing or transmission, so as to bring the public in direct contact with the
work through performance, sound recording, visual or aural means.”117
For three reasons, it is submitted that this definition is defective.
First, using direct contact or direct communication as the decisive cri-
terion for the application of the public performance right is absurd.  Al-
114 It is not implausible, at least in theory, for the “nature of the gathering” to
capture performances in private homes.  However, since such performances are
difficult to monitor in a non-intrusive manner, any attempt to extend the applica-
tion of the public performance right to private homes may raise privacy concerns.
115 The most controversial of which, at least at the international level, seems to be
the notorious reception in public exception of § 110(5).  For the scope of that ex-
ception, see Makeen, supra note 73, at 361-95.
116 Thomas P. Olson, The Iron Law of Consensus: Congressional Responses to
Proposed Copyright Reforms Since the 1909 Act, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 109, 111,
116 (1988).
117 Intellectual Property Code art. 138(15) (Egypt).
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though this criterion was adopted under the old French Author’s Rights
Law of 1957, it had come under heavy criticism and consequently was
abolished in 1985.118  Every performance is in fact an indirect communica-
tion, especially since it necessitates the existence of an agent or intermedi-
ary third party (i.e., performer or CD player) between the work and the
public addressed by the performance.119As Andre Kerever once put it in
the context of French law, the performance of a dramatic work always
necessitated the use of some equipment or decoration,120 yet such commu-
nication was always governed by the public performance right.
Secondly, in countries that recognize both the public performance
right and the communication to the public right, a clear distinction is main-
tained between these two rights.  The distinction normally lies in whether
the performance is given before a gathered audience, i.e., in public, or to
people geographically and/or chronologically dispersed, i.e., to the pub-
lic.121  By including “transmission” as part of the definition, the Egyptian
legislature seems to have committed a teleological error that blurs the de-
marcation line between communication in public or public performance
and communication to the public.122
With the recognition of the communication to the public right in the
IP Code of 2002,123 the scope of the public performance right ought to
have been restricted to communication in public.  Accordingly, the public
performance right should only cover performances given before a gath-
ered audience, whether through live rendition, pre-recorded medium, or
by the reception of a broadcast or webcast carrying musical, dramatic or
118 Loi No. 85-660 du 3 juillet 1985 relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits des
artistes-interpre`tes, des producteurs de phonogrammes et de vide´ogrammes et des
entreprises de communication audiovisuelle, J. OFFICIEL DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE
FRANC¸AIS [JO], 4 juillet 1985, at 7495.
119 For the same meaning, see Alphonse Tournier, Can One Acquire the Owner-
ship of an Intellectual Work According to the French Law of the 11 March 1957, 20
REV. INT’L DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3, 16 (1958).
120 Andre Ke´re´ver, La Distribution par Cable et le Droit d’Auteur en Droit Fran-
c¸ais et dans les Conventions Internationales, DROIT D’AUTEUR 48 (1977).
121 See UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 §§ 19, 20.
122 For the evolution of the distinction between “communication in public” and
“communication to the public” in France, the UK, and the U.S., see Makeen, supra
note 73, at  33-174.
123 Article 138 poorly defines communication to the public as:
Transmission by wire or wireless means of images, sounds, images and
sounds, of a work, performance, sound recording, broadcast in such a way
that, where such transmission is the only means of reception, any person
other than family members and close friends can receive in any place
different from where the transmission originates, irrespective of time and
place of reception, including time and place individually chosen by means
of a computer or any other means.
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musico-dramatic works in public.124  Conversely, the term transmission as
used in the IP Code necessitates the existence of two distinct points, one
for emission and another for potential reception.  In extending the scope
of the public performance right to cover transmissions, the definition pro-
vision seems to have confused communication in public with communica-
tion to the public and rendered a major part of the communication to the
public right otiose.  It is hoped that any future amendment to the IP Code
will abolish the direct contact/communication criterion and omit the term
“transmission” from the definition of public performance.
Thirdly, while this definition was intended to define “performance”
and “public,” the latter term seems to have been completely overlooked
by the legislature and therefore left undefined.  Given the poor drafting of
the Author’s Right Chapter of the IP Code, it is unsurprising that the defi-
nition provision of Article 138, which was specifically inserted to define all
the significant terms used by the legislature, failed to clarify the meaning
and scope of the term “public.”125
Notwithstanding the absence of a statutory definition, it is submitted
that in attempting to come up with a criterion to delimit the scope of the
term public, Egyptian law seems to have progressed through two stages.
During the first stage, the Mixed Courts focused mainly on the nature of
the place.  In a case before the Mixed Court of Cairo in 1935, where the
performance took place in a nightclub, it was held that the nature of the
place was decisive.  The Court went on to state: “[I]t is a settled issue that
a nightclub is a public place from which copyright royalties should be col-
lected.”126  National Courts followed in the footsteps of the Mixed Courts
and held that since a cafe´ is a public place, this on its own is sufficient to
trigger the application of the public performance right.127
The second stage began with the enactment of the 1954 Author’s
Right Law.  Although the 1954 Law did not attempt to define the term
public, it recognized a specific exception to cover “gratuitous perform-
ances within the family circle.”128  This exception was recognized to re-
124 In countries that recognize the communication in public and the communica-
tion to the public as separate and independent prohibited acts, the reception in
public is normally considered a type of communication in public.  This is mainly
because the performance is considered to originate from the receiving set. See UK
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 § 19.
125 In adopting a definition provision, the Egyptian legislature arguably broke
with its legislative drafting tradition and followed a structure that is commonly
used in the copyright systems of the U.S., and the UK.
126 Decision of May 15, 1935, confirmed by the Mixed Court of Appeal on Dec.
18, 1935, Bull. SACEM No. 87, at 262.
127 Ct. of First Instance, 5th Cir. Nov. 7, 1961 (unpublished), cited in LOUTFI,
supra note 49, at 48.
128 Author’s Right Law of 1954 art 11(1).
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spect the privacy of individuals and to comply with the general principle of
law that prohibits unnecessary interference by the government or its agen-
cies in the domestic life of citizens.  For its application, this exception
seems to have explicitly invited courts to assess the composition of the
audience, or the nature of the relationships among those attending the
performance.  As such, this exception seems to have encouraged courts to
abandon the nature of the place and instead to adopt the nature of the
gathering as the sole criterion governing the application of the public per-
formance right.
Using the nature of the gathering under the 1954 Law to distinguish
prohibited public performances from exempted private performances was
supported by scholars and the Court of Cassation.  While commenting on
the scope of the term “public” under the 1954 Law, Professor Sanhuri,
among others, expressed the view that the nature of the place was com-
pletely irrelevant: a private place may become a public place if the public
is permitted to attend.  Similarly, a public place may become private if
rented out for a family gathering.129  Accordingly, he concluded that the
nature of the gathering is determinative.
The same approach was adopted by the Court of Cassation in BEDA
v. San Stefano Hotel, where a number of musical works were performed in
a private members’ club within the hotel.130  The defendant argued that
since the private club was only open to members and their personal
friends, no performance within the club could be classified as a public per-
formance.  The Court of Cassation rejected the defendant’s argument and
held that in deciding on whether a performance is given in public, the na-
ture of the place can be misleading and is therefore irrelevant.131 Accord-
ing to the Court, the sole decisive factor is the nature of the gathering.132
Similar to its predecessor, the IP Code of 2002 did not define the term
“public.”  Nevertheless, it adopted the “gratuitous family circle” excep-
tion.133  Undoubtedly, while adopting this exception and notwithstanding
its poor drafting technique, the legislature was aware of the approach
adopted by the Court of Cassation and the prevailing view among scholars
discussed above.  Therefore, it is submitted that the IP Code did not
129 8 MOSTAFA MOHAMED EL FEQY, SANHURI, EL WASEET FI SHARH EL QUA-
NON EL MADNY 472 (1991); see also AB EL HAMID EL MENSHAWY, HEMAIT AL
MILKIA AL FIKRIAH 39 (2000); LOUTFI, supra note 49, at 39.
130 Cassation Civil, No. 244 Year 30, Feb. 25, 1965.
131 Id.
132 For the same meaning, see EPRS v. Egyptair, Ct. of First Instance, North
Cairo, Case No. 867 for 1989, Oct. 28, 1991; Mashrabia case, Ct. of First Instance
Gizza, Case No. 8610 for 1989, May 22, 1991.
133 Intellectual Property Code art. 171(1) (Egypt).
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change the criterion upon which the public performance is based and
therefore the nature of the gathering remains determinative.134
Generally, the term “public” is often used in contradistinction to the
term “family circle,” or as Loutfi puts it, “it is settled among scholars and
courts that the term public performance is a synonym to ‘non family per-
formance.’”135  Had the family circle been the sole exception recognized
under Egyptian law, then the above phraseology would have been correct
and it would have been possible to refer to all exempted performances as
domestic performances; as opposed to private performances.  Similarly,
had the family circle been the sole exception recognized, the Egyptian leg-
islature would have succeeded where most others fail, namely to maintain
a strict common causality between the criterion governing the public per-
formance right and the statutory exceptions thereto.
However, in addition to the family circle exception, the second sen-
tence of Article 171(1) exempts gratuitous performances by students at an
educational establishment from any copyright liability.136  Therefore, un-
like in the U.S. where numerous exceptions are recognized, in Egypt ex-
empted private performances fall into only two categories: domestic
performances and educational establishment performances.
The domestic or family exception, which is based on the nature of the
gathering, should be interpreted in a manner that conforms to general cul-
tural norms.  Accordingly, it may cover not only family members living
under the same roof, but also all relatives and friends with whom the fam-
ily shares strong ties.  As for the educational establishment exception, it is
restricted to performances by students within an educational establish-
ment.  Curiously, unlike in the UK,137 this educational establishment ex-
ception did not restrict the composition of the audience to any specific
group.138  For this reason, the nature of the gathering seems to be of little
relevance in assessing the scope of that exception.  Instead, this exception
seems to be based on two cumulative criteria: the identity of the per-
former, which must be a student, and the nature of the place, which must
be an educational establishment.
While both exceptions require the performance to be gratuitous, this
requirement seems to be overlooked in the literature.  This could be be-
134 YOUSRIA ABD EL GELIL, EL HEMAYAH EL MADANIA WA EL GINA’IA LEHAQ
EL MOUA’LEF 52 (2005).
135 LOUTFI, supra note 49, at 39.
136 For a similar exception under UK law, see Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988 §. 34(1).
137 Id.
138 This puzzling omission seems to have been copied by the UAE, which based its
author’s rights law on that of Egypt. See Law No. 7 of 2002 (Author’s Rights and
Neighbouring Rights Act art. 22(6)), 383 Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, Year 22 (July 4,
2002).
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cause the lack of gratuitousness was never found to be a cause for which
the application of either exception was denied.  Unfortunately, the word-
ing of the gratuitous requirement provision under the 1954 Law seems to
have used the term “gratuitous” in contradistinction to “direct financial
payment by the audience.”139  Accordingly, similar to the position
adopted in relation to the “for profit” requirement by the U.S. Second
Circuit Court of Appeal in John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co. dis-
cussed above, under the 1954 Law only unauthorised performances where
a direct financial payment was made, such as those that required the
purchase of tickets, would fall outside the scope of the family, educational
establishment, and the now repealed military bands and private associa-
tion exceptions.
The drafting committee of the IP Code 2002 noticed that error and
appropriately changed the wording to disqualify “direct and indirect pay-
ments” from the scope of the family and educational establishment excep-
tions.140  In doing so, the committee not only narrowed the scope of both
exceptions, but also correctly followed the general rule of legislative draft-
ing in commercial and civil matters, which requires exceptions to be nar-
rowly and precisely drafted.
In summary, although the family and educational establishment ex-
ceptions have the gratuitous requirement in common, each follows a dif-
ferent governing criterion.  While the family exception follows the nature
of the gathering, the educational establishment exception follows the iden-
tity of the performer and the nature of the place.   Thus, it could be argued
that the Egyptian legislature was only partly successful in maintaining a
common causality between the criterion governing the application of the
public performance right, i.e., the nature of the gathering, and the statu-
tory exceptions thereto.
CONCLUSION
Compared to France, the U.S. and Egypt recognized the authors’ ex-
clusive right to authorize the public performance of their musical works
relatively late.  Shortly after it had been recognized as one of the exclusive
economic rights in the U.S., the 1909 Copyright Act restricted its scope to
performances for profit.  The curious approach adopted by that Act cre-
ated an unwarranted distinction between dramatic and musical works.
While any authorized public performance of a dramatic work would trig-
ger the application of copyright law, an unauthorized performance of a
musical work had to take place in public and to satisfy the peculiar “for
profit” requirement, in order to constitute infringement.  Although the
139 Author’s Right Law of 1954 art. 11(1) (Egypt).
140 Intellectual Property Code art. 171(1) (Egypt).
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1976 Copyright Act abolished this distinction, the Act seems to have failed
to adopt a public performance right that is subject matter-neutral.  Ac-
cordingly, some of the numerous exceptions of § 110 are subject matter-
specific.
In Egypt, apart from the terminological distinction between represen-
tation of dramatic works and performance of musical works, the public
performance right is subject matter-neutral.  However, in drafting the pub-
lic performance provisions of the 2002 IP Code, the legislature seems to
have lacked consistency.  While the economic rights provision seems to
approach public performance merely as a mode of exploitation, the defini-
tion provision seems to recognize public performance as an economic
right.  Furthermore, the definition given to the term “public performance”
is absurd.  Not only does it define the term “performance” in a way that
confuses communication in public with communication to the public, but
the definition seems to overlook the term “public” altogether.
Similarly, while recognizing the public performance as one of the min-
imum exclusive rights, the Berne Convention failed to deal with the right
in a coherent manner.  Under the Convention, there are five different pro-
visions governing the public performance right, four of which are subject
matter-specific.  Regrettably, not a single provision attempts to define the
term public or provides guidance on where the line should be drawn be-
tween public and private performances.  Accordingly, it is left to each na-
tional law to adopt its own demarcation lines.
Although the U.S. is a copyright system and Egypt is a droit d’auteur
system, both countries seem to reject the concept of “public place” per se
as the criterion upon which the distinction is made between public and
private performances.  This is mainly because a place can be public in na-
ture, but inaccessible to members of the public at the time of the perform-
ance, e.g., rehearsal of a band in a concert hall.  After several
contradictory decisions under the 1909 U.S. Copyright Act, the 1976 Act
settled for the nature of the place and the nature of the gathering as dis-
junctive criteria to distinguish between public and private performances.
In assessing the nature of the place, the accessibility of the place to the
public, or the “availability” as one court put it, seems determinative.
Therefore, under U.S. law, the nature of the place criterion seeks to ascer-
tain whether the place is accessible to the public.
The nature of the gathering, on the other hand, is based on a qualita-
tive and a quantitative standard.   The qualitative standard adopts the fam-
ily circle as the demarcation line between prohibited public performances
and exempted private performances.  Oddly, the quantitative standard
seems to require courts to take the size of the audience into consideration.
In clarifying the scope of the term “public,” Egyptian law had initially
adopted the nature of the place to mean public place and followed it as a
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decisive criterion.  Later, however, the Court of Cassation rejected that
criterion as misleading and irrelevant.  Instead, the nature of the gathering
was adopted as the sole determinative criterion.  Similar to the U.S., the
nature of the gathering is based on the qualitative standard of family cir-
cle. However, unlike in the U.S., Egyptian courts are not required to make
any quantitative assessment when applying the public performance right.
As for the nature of the place, although it is normally dismissed by Egyp-
tian scholars, this article has demonstrated that it may still be relevant in
respect of the educational establishment exception.
In conclusion, under both systems, an event that is accessible to the
public without discrimination would be classified as a public performance.
Similarly, notwithstanding that the public indiscriminately is not admitted,
a performance may still be regarded as a public one if admission is ex-
tended to persons beyond the family circle.  In both systems, calling an
event a private performance does not necessarily make it so.  Thus, while
belonging to two different families of law, the U.S. copyright law and
Egypt’s droit d’auteur seem to follow the same two criteria to distinguish
public from private performances.   Under U.S. copyright law, the nature
of the place is the primary criterion and the nature of the gathering is the
secondary criterion, under Egyptian law the order is reversed.
